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Our earlier NIRA report (Hoshi and Kashyap 2011) examined the major causes of Japan’s economic 
stagnation during the past two decades.  We argued that Japan’s stagnation is due to a failure to adapt 
successfully to three important changes that began to surface in the 1970s.  First, Japan had substantially 
closed its economic gap with most advanced economies in the world.  Growth achieved by simply 
catching up to the frontier economies was no longer possible.   Second, the end of the Breton Woods 
system meant that Japan could no longer rely on the stable and undervalued exchange rate to promote its 
exports.  Third, rapid aging made it impossible for Japan to grow merely by relying on factor 
accumulation.  Collectively these shifts meant Japan needed to adjust if it was to continue to grow.  
Stronger domestic demand and productivity growth coming from its own innovation (rather from 
borrowing technology from more advanced countries) was necessary.  
 The report identified several important mistakes that Japan made in addressing these challenges.  
First, to ease the pain of the structural changes, Japan ended up protecting “zombie firms” that would 
have been put out of business in a normal competitive market.  The zombie firms reduced the profitability 
of healthy competitors, especially potential new entrants with higher innovative capacity.  Second, 
government regulation in many areas discouraged innovation.  Third, there were a set of misguided 
macroeconomic policies in the 1990 and the 2000s.  Monetary policy was not sufficiently expansionary to 
end deflation, so that the price level fell for more than 15 years.  Fiscal policy was inconsistent at best.  
The public works, which were key parts of most of the government stimulus packages that were 
repeatedly enacted, were often harmful.  The public investment was not productive and even worse 
crowded out private sector investment.  Yet despite massive government spending in general, the specific 
funds allocated to tackle the banking problem in the late 1990s and the early 2000s were insufficient.  
Instead the banks remained undercapitalized and some policies even encouraged them to continue to 
support zombie firms.   
 There were some attempts to correct these policy mistakes during the Koizumi government, but 
even the Koizumi reforms did not focus sufficiently on policies that would raise productivity growth.  The 
post-Koizumi governments reversed a number of the Koizumi policies so that the growth outlook by 2012 
remains bleak. 
 In this sequel to Hoshi and Kashyap (2011), we explore several policy options for responding to 
the aforementioned challenges and for restarting growth.  One important consideration is that after our 
original report was published, Japan suffered a set of terrible disasters.  On March 11, 2011, a huge 
earthquake shook Tohoku and Northern Kanto, and a devastating tsunami hit the east coast of Japan.  The 
earthquake and tsunami led all the active nuclear power plants on the coast to shut down.  Most of the 
plants shut down safely, but Fukushima #1 nuclear power plant was an exception.  All the reactors that 
were active when the tsunami hit are now believed to have gone through almost complete meltdown in a 
day or two.  Radioactive materials were released into the environment and the residents of the 
neighboring towns were forced to evacuate.  The policy focus after the disasters naturally centered on 




 The disaster, however, makes it even more important to develop a better long-term growth 
strategy.  Japan is recovering from the disaster, but absent better long-run growth policies, the economy 
will likely lapse back into the stagnant state that prevailed just before the 2011 tragedy.  The disaster does 
nothing to invalidate the observation that the key to Japan’s long term prosperity will depend on its 
productivity growth.   Indeed, if anything, the disaster could allow the affected areas of the Japanese 
economy to make a fresh start.  Japan should consider this as a great opportunity to reposition its policies.  
 In this report, we identify some specific concrete steps Japan can take to jump start growth.  Our 
recommendations are organized around three broad themes: regulatory reform, opening up the Japanese 
economy, and improving macroeconomic policies. Section 2 identifies four types of regulatory relief that 
would improve growth in Japan.  One set of changes show how to reduce the cost of conducting business 
in Japan.  Each of these is achievable and together they would modestly improve business conditions and 
the efficiency of doing business in Japan.  We also explain how to stop the protection of zombie firms, 
and identify several other government regulations that also discourage productivity growth, especially in 
the non-manufacturing parts of the economy. An approach that Koizumi government tried for 
deregulation was the creation of structural reform special zones.  As our earlier report found, these special 
zones had mixed results, so we also explain the conditions that a special zone should satisfy to be growth 
enhancing.  
Section 3 examines the gains that can be achieved by opening up the Japanese economy.  One 
avenue for doing this is via the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which Japan has finally decided to join 
the negotiation.  We explain why participating in this deal is desirable.  A perpetual road block to trade 
negotiations in Japan has been the pressure from agricultural interests to protect that sector from 
competition.   Productivity gains in the Japanese agricultural sector have been dismal and we also discuss 
policies that could help improve that situation.  A third path to openness is through increased immigration.  
We sketch immigration reforms that would be growth enhancing.  
Section 4 explores the growth impediments resulting from poor macroeconomic policies.  The 
threat of a debt crisis that could cripple Japanese growth is real.   We explain why a credible plan for 
fiscal consolidation is necessary and propose some principles that should be part of such a plan.  
Monetary policy has also been bad since the Bank of Japan’s legal independence. We identify the type of 
monetary policy framework that is necessary to end more than a decade long deflationary period.   
Section 5 offers some brief conclusions.  
 
2.  Regulatory Reform 
 
There are many ways in which regulation holds back economic growth in Japan.  We separate our 
proposals to tackle four different aspects of the problem. 
 
2.1. Reducing the costs of doing business in Japan 
One objective indicator of the existing regulatory barriers can be deduced from the World Bank’s annual 
assessment that compares the ease of doing business in 183 countries (Doing Business (2011)).  These 
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calculations are made by comparing 10 types of business regulations in each of countries.1
The regulatory burden is assessed by tracing the specific steps are involved a particular 
transaction that are representative of routine business needs.  For example, one component of the index 
relates to the procedures required to start a business.   To assess what is involved, the Bank measures the 
time, cost, required paid in capital, and number of procedures to get a local limited liability company up 
and running.  Similarly, to study tax burdens, they look at the time, total tax rate, and number of payments 
necessary for a local medium sized company to pay all taxes.   
   
The advantage of studying these very specific tasks is that it is easy to make comparisons across 
countries and to highlight the precise road blocks to doing business.  The downside is that the grades may 
be sensitive to the choice of tasks to be evaluated.   For Japan, our view is that the tasks that they 
concentrate upon are sensible, and the problem areas that are identified surface in other assessments as 
well.  So while we do not claim that this study captures all the ways in which regulation can affect growth, 
or that it perfectly captures the effects on business, we do believe the impediments that are documented 
are real and meaningful.  
Table 1 shows various indicators related to the ease of doing business in Japan and selected other 
countries as of 2011.  We draw two conclusions from these data.  First, and most importantly, business 
regulation in Japan has much scope for improvement.  The overall rank of 20 out of 183 is a little 
deceptive because the bulk of the 183 countries are poor and regulations in many of them are stifling.  A 
more natural benchmark for Japan would be relative to the 31 members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development that are in the sample.  Japan comes in 14th in this set, just above Estonia 
and below Germany; Italy and Greece are the two lowest rated OECD countries.   
  Second, the reason why Japan ranks poorly can be traced to difficulties associated with three 
particular aspects of doing business that are related to business formation, taxes and land use.  The 
problems in starting businesses can be further narrowed to the long lags in completing an application (23 
days for Japan versus the OECD average of 12), and in the number of separate procedures required (8 
steps in Japan versus 5 for the average OECD country).  These hurdles mean that Japan ranks 26th of the 
31 OECD countries in ease of starting a business.  As Table 1 shows this also puts Japan below other 
wealthy Pacific and East Asian countries.   
The tax difficulties in Japan arise because the overall rate is high, 49.1 percent of profits in Japan 
versus the global average of 44.8, and because of high compliance costs (330 hours per year versus an 
OECD average of 186).  As indicated in the table, it is more difficult to pay taxes for a business in Japan 
than in Greece, and is roughly comparable to China.  As documented by Djankov et al (2010), higher 
business taxes deter fixed investment, foreign direct investment and entrepreneurial activity.   
Japan also is a difficult place to register land and obtain construction permits.  The registration 
challenges are mainly due to fees involved in land transfers.  In Japan two businesses that are transferring 
a land title pay 5.7% of the property value in fees, versus an OECD average of 4.4.  In getting a permit to 
build a warehouse, it takes 193 days in Japan to complete the process versus 152 in the typical OECD 
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Japan should directly address all three of these impediments.  There are several respects in which 
Japan does not follow international best practices to support business formation. Most importantly, there 
is not one-stop shopping, whereby an applicant can use a single point of contact to complete all the 
requisite paperwork.  Instead, a Japanese new business go through separate procedures with the ward 
office, the legal affairs bureau of the Ministry of Justice, the District Tax Office, the local tax office, the 
Labor Standards Inspection Office, the Social Insurance Office and the Public Employment Security 
Office.  Malaysia, Vietnam and Korea all have one-stop shopping for startups and there is no reason 
Japan could not as well.  
  Inefficient land use policies have long been cited as an efficiency barrier in Japan (e.g. Ito 1992, 
chapter 14).   
Haidar (2012) shows regulatory reforms to reduce the cost of doing business does lead to higher 
growth.  He starts by counting the number of regulatory reforms in ten areas covered by the Cost of Doing 
Business ranking over five years from 2006 to 2010 for 172 countries.  The potential scope for reforms 
could be as high as 50.   In the sample, the observed range of reforms lies between 0 and 23 with the 
mean of about 6.5.  He then runs regressions of the annual average economic growth rate from 2006 to 
2010 on the regulatory reform variable with a variety of other control variables.  The regression suggests 
that each regulatory reform increases the average growth rate by 0.11% to 0.15%.  In his dataset, the 
number of regulatory reform for Japan is 3.3
In section 4 of the report we offer more details on the role of adjusting taxes in Japan as part of a 
comprehensive fiscal consolidation.  Our proposed solution focuses on increasing the consumption tax to 
improve the long-run budget outlook.  But, a shift from a reliance on business taxes to consumption taxes 
would be pro-growth in that doing so promotes investment. 
  Taken literally this suggests if Japan had implemented the 
average number of reforms in the sample (6.5), the annual growth rate would have been higher by 0.525%. 
But even if we worry that the controls are imperfect, and the estimates are too high, it seems that Japan 
could grow substantially faster if it were to deregulate.    
High existing business taxes in Japan are also a consequence of its inefficient tax collection 
system.  Because large corporations are required to withhold taxes before they pay their employees' 
salaries, the tax agency has fairly precise information about the salaried workers' taxable income. Farmers 
and self-employed workers are not required to have taxpayer IDs. This facilitates the underreporting of 
their income and complicates the ability to track retirement contributions.  So one additional step Japan 
should take is to institute a comprehensive taxpayer identification system.  
There are obvious reforms that would improve the efficiency of land use, too.  As mentioned 
above the fees for transferring land in Japan are unusually high, and the time involved in getting 
permission in Japan is relatively long.  Cutting the transfer fees is straightforward and is consistent with 
the general preference for having a less complicated tax system.  The permission process in Japan now 
takes longer than it did in 2006, in part because of the scandal that involved falsified certifications of 
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3 We thank Jamal Haidar for sharing the data for Japan. 
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earthquake resistance of structures.4
 A related problem arises in cases where farm land is to be transferred.  For historical reasons, 
Japan has taxed farm land at extremely favorable rates (relative to other types of land).  This tax 
preference has the perverse effect of making it economical to have land earmarking for farming even in 
densely populated areas.  Moreover, when someone does decide to eventually sell farm land, the poor 
official record keeping can be an impediment.  The farm land registry is antiquated and error-ridden.  It 
should be updated and modernized so that transfers can be done quickly without leaving doubts about 
whether a clear title has been conferred to the new owner.  
  In response to that scandal the scrutiny of subsequent applications 
has been increased but the staff of qualified examiners has not kept up, so that there is now a backlog in 
the inspection process.  Increasing staff would be desirable.    
Finally, Japan has the possibility of creating a one-time gain in economic efficiency by improving 
the addressing system used in Tokyo and other cities.  Currently, addresses are given based on the 
location’s position relative to a nearby area rather than its position on the street.  In particular, for each 
area, the numbers are generally assigned using a clockwise algorithm that breaks up the circumference of 
the zone into equal segments and each house is given a number that most closely matches its location.  In 
a large city like Tokyo, areas themselves are assigned numbers (chome) and considered parts of wider 
area (e.g., Ginza 1-chome, Ginza 2-chome, and so on).  Therefore, adjacent buildings need not have 
consecutive addresses.  In some rare cases, two houses can share the same address.  This leads to lots of 
wasted time as people search for addresses and arrange to send maps ahead of meetings.  While there 
would be substantial short-run disruptions to rationalizing the addresses, the long-term gains would be 
enormous.    
South Korea offers a test case.  The Japanese-style addressing system there was established by 
Japan during its 1910 annexation of Korea.  Korea has begun moving to a street-based system.   Since the 
Law for Indicating the Address based on the Street Name became effective in 1997, the Korean 
government has been giving street names and addresses to all the buildings in South Korea.  A timeline 
for this project is found on their web site5.  The plates for street names and house addresses were installed 
by October 2010, and all the uses of address for public services will be moved to the new street address 
system by the end of 2013.  According to a report in Geospatial World, the Korean government estimated 
that the reform will save about 4.3 trillion won (about 3.8 billion dollar at the exchange rate of 1,118 won 
per dollar) a year.6
 
  
2.2. Stopping protection for zombies 
The previous report explained why supporting the operations of zombie firms reduces growth.  Beginning 
with the Takenaka reforms in late 2002, the Japanese banks (at least large banks) were forced to shed 
their non-performing loans.  This was a turning point, but during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, 
the government reversed policy to resume supporting zombies.  The most recent policies encourage banks 
                                                          






to help their troubled customers, especially small and medium enterprises.  Stopping the protection of the 
zombies is a necessary step for revival of economic growth in Japan. 
 The first sign that the government was resuming its policy of tacitly enabling zombies came on 
November 7, 2008, less than two months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The Financial Services 
Agency (FSA) announced a policy called Measures to Facilitate the Easing of Lending Terms for Loans 
to Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises.  This narrowed the definition of restructured loans, a category 
of classified loans.7
After the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the election in fall 2009, the measures for the 
facilitation of financing for SMEs were enshrined in law. The Act concerning Temporary Measures to 
Facilitate Financing for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs), which was passed on November 
30, 2009, stipulated that financial institutions should make efforts to respond favorably to loan 
modification requests from small and medium-sized business borrowers. This resulted in a further change 
to the FSA’s Inspection Manual to stipulate that, even if a debtor had not yet formulated a highly feasible 
and comprehensive business reconstruction plan, if the debtor was a small or medium-sized enterprise and 
there was a good prospect that the enterprise would formulate such a business reconstruction plan within 
the period of one year from the date on which the conditions of the loan were changed, the loan need not 
be classified as being restructured. In other words, the mere pledge that a business reconstruction plan 
was being planned was enough to allow a company’s loan to be classified as normal.  
  Previously the FSA’s Inspection Manual for Deposit-Taking Institutions had stated 
that a loan with relaxed terms can still be classified as “normal” only if the company has a comprehensive 
business reconstruction plan that would make the loan performing in around three years.  Under the new 
policy banks could classify a restructured SME loan “normal” if a company has a reconstruction plan 
which would make the loan performing in around five years; even loans to companies that would follow a 
plan that make a loan performing after 5 years but within 10 could be counted as normal. This change 
shifted some loans that previously would have been counted as restructured to being classified as normal. 
Following these regulatory changes, the banks restructured many SME loans but avoided labeling 
them as non-performing.  According to the FSA, subsequent to the enactment of the SME Financing 
Facilitation Act, borrowers with a total of 42 trillion yen of SME loans applied for restructuring, of which 
banks agreed to restructure 39 trillion yen as of the end of June 2011; in other words, loans of over 7 
percent of GDP were reorganized under this program and virtually everyone who sought assistance got 
it.8
Figure 1 shows the reported amount of restructured loans for large banks and regional banks 
separately.  It is hard to get precise estimates on how many non-performing loans are classified normal 
due to the regulatory changes, the fact that the amount of reported restructured loans declined during the 
severe recession following the global financial crisis suggests that the non-performing loans at Japanese 
banks are seriously underreported.  Thus, the zombie problem is likely to re-emerge if it has not done so.  
When the act was passed in November 2009 it was scheduled to be a temporary measure, in effect until 
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the end of March 2011, but was later extended until the end of March 2012.  In December 2011, the act 
was extended by one more year.  The “final extension” set the terminal date of March 31, 2013. 
Ironically, there is a well-known precedent for rolling over this kind of support.  After the Great 
Kanto Earthquake in 1923, the Diet passed an emergency bill that allowed banks to present notes issued 
by the firms that were adversely affected by the quake to the Bank of Japan for rediscounting. The BOJ 
would allow up to two years for repayment.  It was widely reported that many bills that were doubtful for 
reasons unrelated to the earthquake were rediscounted through this program.  Moreover, when the 
temporary program was to end in 1925, it was argued that the economy was too weak to discontinue it, 
and it was renewed for another two years. 
Similarly, when the size of the banking problems in Japan were still being debated in 1997 the 
Diet temporarily eliminated the cap on the amount of insured deposits, thus effectively guaranteeing all 
bank deposits.  This support was supposed to be temporary, with a targeted expiration in April 2001.  But 
as that date approached, concerns that the banking system was still too weak to function without it were 
raised, and the guarantee was extended until April 2002.  Eventually the guarantee was rescinded but 
certain deposit classes remained protected, so that the effective withdrawal of support was quite gradual.  
It is clear Japan has a long history of having trouble removing subsidies once they are in place.  
So the regulatory forbearance on classifying bad loans is not unique.  But, a return to robust growth 
requires this policy to cease.  
 
2.3. Deregulation especially in non-manufacturing sectors 
The high cost of starting up businesses in Japan that we discussed above is mostly a result of regulation.  
Despite some deregulation efforts in the last couple of decades, many industries still face onerous 
restrictions that hamper growth.  The situation is especially serious in non-manufacturing industries.  
Figure 2 reproduces a figure from our previous report that shows the degree of regulations in 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries separately.  The non-manufacturing industry here 
consists of the especially growth challenged industries that we identified in the previous report: 
construction, retail & wholesale trade, real estate, agriculture, finance & insurance, and hotels & 
restaurants.  The figure is based on the regulation index compiled by the Cabinet Office (2006).  The 
index is constructed by counting the number of regulations on the book for each industry every year.  In 
addition to the regulations on the books, their measure tracks the deregulations that opened up new 
business areas or new products each year.  To account for those changes in the regulation, they assume 
that the new business areas and products were effectively banned by the regulation before the 
deregulations even when such regulations are not on the book.  The figure shows the deregulation took 
place in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing during the decade from 1995 to 2005.  For the non-
manufacturing, however, the deregulation slowed down substantially during the last half of the period.  
The previous report pointed out a weak empirical relation between the extent of deregulation and the 
growth of total factor productivity (TFP) at least for non-manufacturing industries.  Thus, the slowdown 
of deregulation likely contributed to the lack of productivity growth in non-manufacturing industry. 
Figure 3 shows the TFP growth rate for manufacturing and non-manufacturing separately for 
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selected OECD countries.  The data come from EU KLEMS9
Thus, it is important for Japan to speed up the deregulation especially in non-manufacturing 
industries.  This idea is not new.  Indeed the Japanese government would claim that they have been 
promoting deregulation to restore growth for more than 10 years.  Table 2 shows the series of government 
commissions and councils that were created to advance deregulation in various areas.  Each deregulation 
commission consisted of 15 or so business and academic leaders.  Each commission formulated a three-
year plan for deregulation and recommended it for the government.  The commissions also examined how 
the government has handled previous recommendations.   
.  Japan’s TFP growth rate is at near bottom 
for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing.  For the non-manufacturing, the situation is especially 
serious: the level of total factor productivity has not increased since the early 1990s. 
Despite these efforts, some onerous regulations remain.  The fact that the regulation indices for 
non-manufacturing stopped falling after the late 1990s suggests that the process has not been effective 
enough.  The previous commissions’ follow up examinations highlight the recurring unwillingness to 
fully engage these problems.  For example, the Commission on Regulatory Reforms specified 429 
deregulatory measures to be implemented during fiscal 2002.  Of these 429, only 208 were implemented 
during the fiscal year10.  The report claims that another 217 items were “partially” implemented.  As of 
March 2008, there were 25 items that were supposed to be implemented by March 2004 but not yet 
implemented.  Only one of them was implemented in fiscal 200811.  There were additional 30 items that 
were supposed to be implemented by March 2007, but none of them was implemented in fiscal 200812  Of 
the 362 items that were to be implemented in fiscal 2008, only 212 were actually implemented13
Another problem is that many recommendations made by the commissions are counted as 
deregulation when this is not really the case.  For example, the commissions often suggest that regulatory 
agencies should conduct a survey or research to understand the current problems with existing regulations.  
These studies often occur, but they do not reduce the regulation at all. 
. 
Here we describe two modest examples where growth enhancing deregulation would be possible.  
Both of these have been discussed by the commissions at some point but neither of them has been fully 
implemented.    
One example of counter-productive regulation relates to the rules concerning combined provision 
of medical treatments covered by the national health care insurance and uncovered treatments, such as 
some experimental treatments or uses of advanced drugs that have not been approved in Japan.  The 
patients can receive uncovered treatments if they pay the full cost, but if they do this they would be 
required to pay full cost for all the covered treatments that are related as well retroactively.  The 
prohibition is not explicitly based on law, but the national health insurance system has been enforcing the 
rule.  In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition is consistent with the Health Insurance Act. 
The prohibition creates high hurdles for the deliveries of advanced medical treatments and as a 








result slows down the technological progress of the medical service and related industries, which are often 
considered to be a growth area in many advanced countries.  We are not aware of any studies that 
quantify the benefits of relaxing the prohibition, but given the size and growth of healthcare industry it 
could be substantial. 
Another area that would benefit from deregulation is child care.  According to a survey by the 
Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, there were more than 25,000 children who were on the waiting 
lists for nurseries as of April 1, 2011.  Collectively nurseries were operating at more than 96% of the 
capacity.   
The shortage of the supply of child care services is primary due to stringent regulations that limit 
new entry and competition.  For example, a nursery faces rules governing the number of caregivers per 
child, the floor area per child, outdoor playing ground, nursing room, kitchen, rest room for children, etc.  
The conditions are centrally set by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, and common to all cities 
and towns whether they are located in an urban area or not. Consequently, the regulations are more 
onerous in the metropolitan areas and the shortages there are more acute.  
Another type of institutions that provides child care is kindergarten but they are only open to 
children older than 3 years old and can only accept children for a half day.  This is because kindergartens 
are considered to provide schooling for young children.  They are also strictly regulated by the Ministry 
of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology which must approve their operations. .  In practice 
this serves to minimize competition between nurseries and kindergartens.  
Proposals have been made to integrate kindergartens and nurseries, and allow some organizations 
to provide both kindergarten and nursery services at the same premises.  This could introduce competition 
between existing kindergartens and nurseries and ease expansion efforts by more efficient providers.  If 
this goes forward along with a relaxation of the approval criteria, the supply of child care could be 
increased.  Mitigating the shortage of child care facilities would make it easier for parents (mostly 
mothers) to go back to work sooner and could make it easier for families to raise children.  Any steps in 
this direction would help raise the very low birth rate which is a priority.  
The latest government bill submitted to the Diet on this issue is not very helpful.  It would allow 
kindergarten operators to expand into providing nursery facilities on the same premises.  But in order to 
expand, the kindergartens need to comply with all the existing rules governing nurseries.  Although they 
can use the existing building, they have to satisfy a whole set of different rules. A more rational policy 
would recognize the synergies between operating kindergartens and nurseries and relax some 
requirements.  
In summary, there are many regulatory reforms especially in non-manufacturing that would help 
Japan’s growth.  Japanese government has been calling for the deregulation for more than 15 years but the 
accomplishments have been limited.  After the Koizumi government and especially under the DPJ 
governments, the efforts for regulatory reforms have slowed down markedly.  It is important for Japan to 
renew the efforts to restore the growth. 
 
2.4. Growth enhancing special zones 
Creation of special zones was one of the major initiatives under the Koizumi government.  Many of them, 
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however, simply had temporary effects that raised growth for a little while but made no lasting difference.  
As we pointed out in our previous report, the special zones were hamstrung by their dual mandate.  On 
the one hand, special zones were experiments to relax or abolish some national regulations in selected 
local areas.  If an experiment is judged successful, the deregulation was expanded to the rest of Japan.  On 
the other hand, another important goal of the special zones was revitalization of local economies.  The 
special zones projects emphasized a bottom-up approach where local entities took initiatives to design 
regulatory reforms that they saw promising.  The central government did not impose strict guidelines or 
provide financial support.  Local governments and businesses often came up with special zones that were 
designed to give themselves small regulatory advantages to shift demand from neighboring localities.   
A case in point is the proliferation of “doburoku” zones. “Doburoku” is home-brewed sake and 
selling such sake was illegal.  Under the Koizumi reform, a few villages started allowing production and 
sales of doburoku in their special zones.  The attempts were considered initially successful as tourists 
poured in and stimulated these remote village economies. The success, however, was short-lived.  When 
many other villages across the country followed suit, they ended up competing for the same (limited) 
demand and many of them failed to attract tourists. 
Not all special zones fared so poorly. Two prominent examples with lasting impact are the 
Advanced Medical Cluster in Kobe and the International Exchange Zone in Kitakyushu, Fukuoka. Both 
zones simplified visa application process to attract highly talented foreigners. Each zone had its own 
distinct features as well. Kobe’s Advanced Medical Cluster relaxed the restriction imposed on faculty 
members of national universities to prohibit them from taking any outside jobs. Kitakyushu’s special zone 
included a variety of deregulatory measures, such opening customs for clearance 24 hours a day, 
reduction of the fees for overnight (expedited) services, and simplified application for landfill usage.  
Kobe’s special zone attracted more than 215 companies between 2003 and 2011. Kitakyushu’s special 
zone attracted 35 firms between 2002 and 2008, and boosted local demand. 
These successful examples show that the special zones can spur the economic growth if they are 
designed to target some important deregulatory measures rather than to shift the demand away from other 
cities.  Japan can reintroduce the special zones for structural reform that exclusively focus on eliminating 
potentially useless regulations.    
The most recent government policies in this domain do not look very promising.  In response to 
the March 2011 tragedy the government eventually passed the Act for Special Zones for Reconstruction 
in December 2011.  The law allows the local governments in the affected areas to establish special zones 
to support reconstruction.  As of April 24, 2012, 14 special zones in five prefectures in the affected area 
had been approved.  Table 3 lists these special zones and major provisions for each zone.  Many of the 
zones offer subsidies and tax incentives for companies to invest in the affected areas.  In principle these 
policies could contribute to longer term prosperity, but in fact most do not meet this standard. Some are 
old fashioned industrial policies to promote targeted industries in targeted areas.  Others are just subsidies 
to rescue the firms in the affected areas, with no controls to make sure that the firms will be viable.  One 
zone (Fukushima IV) is designed to provide subsidies to one financial institution (Development Bank of 
Japan) so that it can rescue one large company (Mitsubishi Shindo) in the region.  Only a few measures 
involve deregulation to encourage competition and productivity growth.  Thus, looking forward these 
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reconstruction zones are not likely to contribute very much to renewed growth in the region. 
 
3. Opening up the Japanese Economy 
 
 There are various factors that insulate the Japanese economy from international competition.  
Here we show how three of them could be reformed to aid growth. 
 
3.l.  Trade Liberalization  
 Especially important on this front is to negotiate successfully Japan’s membership in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP).  The TPP has received substantial media and political attention, but 
substantively it can also be an important step forward for opening up Japan and stimulating growth. 
TPP is a trade agreement that was originally signed by New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, and 
Brunei in 2005.  Later the U.S. joined the negotiations (along with Australia, Malaysia, Peru, and 
Vietnam and the original members) for expanding the TPP.  Compared with other typical free trade 
agreements (FTA), the TPP aims to include more countries, cover a larger number of industries, and to 
rely on few exceptions.  Japan had intended to decide whether to join the negotiations by June 2011, but 
that date was pushed back after the March 2011 disasters.  In November, 2011, Japan finally applied to be 
included in the TPP negotiations. 
 Starting in the early 2000s, Japan has established FTAs with several countries, but these covered 
smaller trading partners, rather than the country’s largest trading partners, such as China, the U.S., or 
South Korea.  Joining the TPP would link Japan and the U.S. and thus have a significant impact on the 
Japanese economy.  Other major trading partners, such as China, South Korea, and Canada, are also said 
to be considering joining the TPP. 
 The effects of reducing trading barriers on consumer welfare are well-known.    Consumers will 
have access to cheaper imported goods.  Producers may gain or lose from trade liberalization.  The 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem in international trade predicts that income for the factor of production used 
more in the goods for which the country has comparative advantage (for example, high skilled workers in 
an advanced economy like Japan) will increase while income for the factor of production used in less 
competitive goods (for example, low skilled workers in countries like Japan) will fall following trade 
liberalization.  In light of this, economists (including us) favor policies that compensate the groups that 
are harmed by trade deals to soften the blow and share the gains more broadly. 
 Less well-known, but in Japan’s case a perhaps more important impact of trade liberalization is 
its potential effect on productivity growth.  Recent empirical research using data from many countries has 
established that exporting firms and firms that undertake FDI (foreign direct investment) tend to have 
higher productivity than purely domestic firms.  This is the case mainly because high productivity firms 
are better able to afford the start-up costs needed to export and invest abroad (see Melitz 2003).  
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) shows that the gains from trade suggested by Melitz 
(2003) type models are still roughly the same as the gains implied by more traditional models that focus 
on the consumers, but the new models suggests at least a new channel (productivity growth) through 
which trade can increases the welfare. 
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Recent research using Japanese data suggests that competing in global markets may directly 
increase the productivity of the firms.  For example, Wakasugi et al. (2008) compares the productivity of 
two groups of Japanese firms.  One group called “switchers” are those firms that started to export (or 
make FDI) for the first time in 2001 and continued to do so at least till 2005.  The other group called 
“non-switchers” are those firms that continued to be domestic throughout the sample period.  Figures 4 
and 5 (adapted from figures 7 and 8 in Wakasugi et al. 2008) show the result.  For either firms that 
become exporters or foreign investors, productivity growth subsequent to starting the international 
activities is faster than for comparable firms that remain domestic. 
 Another paper by Todo and Shimizutani (2007) shows that the faster productivity growth of FDI 
firms at least partially comes from the access to more advanced technology abroad.  They estimate the 
impact of R&D investments conducted in foreign affiliates of Japanese multinationals on the productivity 
of their operations in Japan.  They distinguish between two types of foreign R&D activities: “innovative 
R&D” that includes basic research, applied research and development for the world market and “adaptive 
R&D” that includes development for the local market, designing for the world market, and designing for 
the local market.  They find the innovative foreign R&D increases productivity substantially while the 
adaptive foreign R&D does not raise productivity.  The coefficient estimates suggest that the impact of 
foreign innovative R&D on the productivity is often larger than the impact of domestic R&D.  
 These results suggest that trade liberalizations like the TPP will not only enhance the consumer 
welfare through the standard channel but also increase the productivity growth and economic growth by 
exposing Japanese firms to international competition. 
 
3.2. Reduction of agricultural subsidies 
The agricultural sector is heavily subsidized in many advanced economies.  The level of protection for the 
Japanese agriculture, however, is unusually high.  Figure 6 shows the producer support estimates (PSE) 
calculated by OECD for selected countries. The PSE seeks to measure the annual monetary value of gross 
transfers from consumers and taxpayers to support agricultural producers.  Japan’s PSE is much higher 
than the U.S. and higher than the EU. The level of support for Japan declined in the first half of the last 
decade, but has begun rising again.   The decline of PSE and the subsequent rise reflect the Koizumi 
reform and the post-Koizumi reversal that our previous report pointed out.  For 2010, the PSE is 
estimated to be $53 billion (or ¥4.664 trillion assuming an exchange rate of 88 yen/dollar). This happens 
to be almost exactly equal to the value added of the agricultural sector in 2010 (¥4.665 trillion).  Thus, the 
total value added of the agricultural sector is completely offset by the subsidies, implying the net 
contribution of the Japanese agriculture in value added terms is zero. 
 The agricultural subsidies were used mostly to protect small inefficient farms rather than 
encouraging efficient farms to expand.  Thus, the productivity of agriculture in Japan stagnated.  Figure 7 
shows the total factor productivity growth of the agricultural sector for selected countries.  The 
productivity data again comes from EU KLEMS.  The figure shows productivity growth in agriculture for 
Japan has been by far the lowest among these countries. 
The Japanese agriculture industry is heavily skewed towards the elderly.  Figure 8 shows the 
population distribution of farm workers at commercial farms (i.e., excluding those farms that  produce 
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only for own use and not for sale) as of 2010.  Remarkably, the majority of farm workers are 75 years old 
or older. 
The number of commercial farms in Japan has been declining as we can see from Figure 9.  This 
is inevitable because of the aging workforce.  A problem for Japan is that the fall of the number of 
commercial farms has been partially offset by increases in non-commercial farms and in households that 
own farm land but do not farm.  Low appraisal values in tax calculations for land designated as farm land 
make the cost of holding onto land very affordable even if the land is not generating any income.  Many 
farmers, especially in urban areas, hold on to these “farms” waiting for future opportunities to convert 
them to a commercial use and make huge capital gains.   
Godo (2010) argues that some farmers use their farm lands for non-farming activities such as 
parking lots or industrial waste dumping sites without formally converting them.  This is possible because 
there is no centrally administered farm land registry with decent accuracy.  There are numerous registries 
that are created for different purposes: one for farmers’ insurance, another for property taxation, yet 
another for rationing of rice production, etc.  There is a Farmland Standard Registry that is supposed to 
record sales, leases, and conversions of farm land, but the registry is maintained and updated by 
Agriculture Committees of each town/village and is well known for its inaccuracies according to experts 
(Godo, 2010, pp.20-27). 
The increased presence of non-farms and non-commercial farms that own farmland damages 
agriculture in the ways similar to zombie firms in other industries harm the economy.  They reduce the 
expansion of productive farms and stifle new entry.  The increase of these zombie farms is a serious issue 
for the Japanese agricultural sector. 
As the previous report discussed, the Koizumi government started to change the agricultural 
policy to reform the nature of subsidies.  For example, the government tried to concentrate agricultural 
subsidies and support to large and productive commercial farms.  The policy had some loopholes (such as 
making it possible for small farms and non-farms households to create a collective farm just to receive 
subsidies without any increase in efficiency), but the change that Koizumi introduced was in the right 
direction.  After Koizumi stepped down as the prime minister, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), then 
the ruling party, started backtracking on this reform because the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), then 
the opposition, was gaining support from small farmers who were dissatisfied with the reform.  The 
government led by Yasuo Fukuda in 2007 changed the policy (back) to subsidizing all the farmers 
including small ones.   The DPJ, after taking the power in 2009, continued the re-expansion of the 
agricultural subsidies.  At the core of DPJ agricultural policy was the Individual Income Compensation 
Policy for Farmers, which pays the farmers the difference between the market price and the production 
cost of crops.  Since the production cost is calculated using a standard hourly rate for the labor, the policy 
rewards farms with low productivity. 
To stop the declining agricultural productivity, Japan needs to roll back the agricultural policy to 
what Koizumi government tried to implement by focusing on promoting large scale and efficient farming.  
With a smaller amount of subsidies, some zombie farms would decide to exit.  To stop the rise of non-
farm households who hold on to farmlands, it will be useful to follow Godo’s suggestion (2010, pp.162-
168) to create a centrally administered farmland registry that is constructed using a thorough inspection of 
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the current use of farmland.  
 
3.3. New immigration policy 
 Our earlier report identified aging as a fundamental cause for Japan’s economic slowdown.  
Encouraging migration to Japan can slow down the aging induced labor force decline and can help Japan 
restore its growth.  One potential problem of increasing foreign workers is potential crowding out of jobs 
for natives.  If immigrant workers just replace the jobs previously occupied by the native Japanese, 
immigration does not lead to economic growth.  If the increase of immigrant workers depresses the wages 
in general, the labor supply of Japanese workers for those jobs that compete with immigrant workers may 
decline, leading to further stagnation of the economy. 
 The recent empirical work, mostly from the U.S., suggests that such crowding out is not likely to 
be a problem at least when considered over the course of several years (during which people and markets 
can adjust).  Immigration tends to increase total employment.  Moreover, immigration is also associated 
with higher rate of innovation.   For example, using state level data on patenting from the U.S., Hunt and 
Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) find that a one percentage point rise in the share of immigrant college graduates 
increases patents per capita by 6%.  They also find the immigration has positive spill-overs, in the sense 
the immigrants’ innovative activities stimulate non-immigrant inventors.  When one takes into account 
the spill-over effect, a one percentage point rise in the share of immigrant college graduates eventually 
leads to 15% increase in the patents per capita.  
 The net immigration rate into Japan has increased recently but miniscule compared with other 
advanced economies.  For example, Table 4 shows the net migration rates as well as the proportions of 
migrants for G7 countries.  Japan is by far the least open country judging by either the stock of foreign 
workers or the flow of new immigrants. The lack of migration into Japan reflects the restrictive policy 
toward foreigners in Japan.  The Japanese government has been limiting the immigrant workers with 
permanent residency only to people with Japanese ancestry within three generations (i.e. grand children of 
Japanese).  The opportunity for Japanese descendants who do not meet that requirement and other 
foreigners to work in Japan on a permanent basis is extremely limited.  Japan does not try hard enough to 
integrate the few foreigners into Japanese society, either.  The last column of Table 4 reports whether the 
country has explicit policies aimed at integration of non-citizens.  Japan is the only country among G7 
that does not have such a policy.  Relaxing these restrictions would be a good starting point to increase 
immigrant flows. 
 A more ambitious and beneficial policy would be to significantly lower the barriers to becoming 
a Japanese permanent resident when applicants meet several criteria.  These criteria could include 
requiring adults to be proficient in speaking Japanese and having the wealth and intentions of starting a 
business.  Alternatively entry could be granted for people with graduate education and a demonstrated job 
offer.  Canada has used such policies with great success and even a modest program of this type could 






4.  Macroeconomic Policy Reforms 
 
Japan has also been held back by poor macroeconomic policies.  We first review challenges for fiscal 
policy and then discuss potential monetary policy reforms. 
 
4.1. Fiscal Consolidation 
 Japan’s fiscal expansion policy after the collapse of the bubble economy may have been effective 
initially.  At least with hindsight, the decision to reverse the fiscal expansion in 1997 was a mistake, 
which put Japan back into recession.  By the late 1990s, however, the fiscal expansion seemed to have 
morphed in undesirable ways.  As we showed in our previous report, the increased government spending 
crowded out private sector investment.  The majority of the government expenditure was used to finance 
low productivity public works.   
 Continued fiscal expansion, combined with stagnating tax revenues, led to high budget deficits 
and increasing government debt.  As late as 2003, Broda and Weinstein (2005) concluded that the ratio of 
government debt to GDP could be stabilized if the government was willing to raise taxes and cut spending.  
The Koizumi government was moving in that direction. As the tax revenue increased during the economic 
recovery in the mid-2000s, the budget deficit started to shrink.  The global recession of 2008-2009, 
however, prompted the government to change its policies and in doing so created new, very large budget 
deficits. 
 When the sustainability calculation of Broda and Weinstein (2005) was replicated using the data 
up to 2010, Doi, Hoshi, and Okimoto (2011) concluded that unprecedented, extremely large tax increases 
would be necessary to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio, even if the adjustment period was stretched to be 
100 years.  Worse, they show such a drastic fiscal consolidation is politically unlikely, judging from the 
observations from the last 30 years.  This is just one of the many recent papers that show the current fiscal 
stance of Japan is not sustainable14
This dire conclusion immediately raises two additional questions.  First, why are interest rates on 
Japanese government bonds (JGBs) so low if the debt dynamics are so precarious?  Second, what kind of 
budget policies should be pursued to correct the problems? 
. 
 Hoshi and Ito (2012) help answer this first question. They begin by identifying three factors that 
have made it attractive to hold Japanese government bonds (JGBs) at the prevailing low interest rates. 
First, most of the Japanese government bonds are held by the Japanese residents, who for various reasons 
seem to prefer to hold these securities.  Second, the long stagnation of the Japanese economy has meant 
that Japanese financial institutions have faced limited investment opportunities so that in relative terms 
the JGB yield is adequate.  Third, financial market participants still believe that the Japanese government 
will eventually take corrective budget actions.  
 They then ask how long these conditions might be expected to persist.  Because the aging has 
started to reduce Japan’s private saving rate, the total pool of private savings by Japanese residents is 
                                                          
14 Other studies include Doi (2009), Hosono and Sakuragawa (2011), Imrohoroğlu and Sudo (2011), Doi and Ihori 
(2009), Ito (2011), Ito,Watanabe and Yabu (2011), Ostry et al. (2010), and Gagnon (2011). 
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destined to shrink. This suggests that it might be useful to determine when the amount of government 
debt will exceed the total private savings in Japan.  Doing this kind of calculation requires making 
demographic assumptions to determine savings levels and making assumptions about the path for future 
debt.  One important consideration is the connection between future deficits (and debt levels) and interest 
rates.   
Hoshi and Ito (2012) consider three alternative assumptions about how the interest rate responds 
to increasing government debt, and simulate the future paths of the private sector financial assets and the 
government debt both in relation to GDP.  Under the first assumption, the interest rate is determined by 
the larger of the current interest rate (1.3%) or the growth rate of GDP regardless of the level of debt to 
GDP ratio.  The second assumption assumes the interest rate increases by 2 basis points for every 1 
percentage point increase in the debt to GDP ratio above the 2010 level.  The third assumption assumes 
the interest rate increase for every 1 percentage point increase in the debt to GDP ratio is 3.5 basis points.  
The simulation exercises show that the Japanese government debt will exceed the private financial assets 
sometimes between 2022 and 2024 at the current pace.  If this occurs then it must be the case that the 
marginal buyer of JGBs can no longer be a Japanese citizen.  In that case, there could be a rapid change in 
JGB pricing. 
 Even with low interest rates, accumulation of debt raises the proportion government revenue that 
must be devoted to paying interest on the debt. Hoshi and Ito (2012) assume that once interest payments 
surpass 35% of the total government revenue the economy is vulnerable to a crisis.  Even under the most 
favorable assumption for the interest rates (Assumption #1), the Japanese budget comes within 2 
percentage points of the danger zone by 2027.  Under the other assumptions, the budget reaches within 2 
percentage points of the danger zone by 2017.  At that point, a small increase in the government’s 
borrowing rate, which may come from positive developments for the Japanese economy or because of 
concerns over the government financial condition, could trigger a crisis. 
 Perhaps the most important reason why financial market participants do not seem to have any 
concerns about Japanese government debt is their faith in the ability of the government to rearrange the 
budget situation.  Hoshi and Ito (2012) give an example of tax policy changes that would stabilize the 
debt to GDP ratio under each of the three interest rate assumptions.  The sustainable policies take as a 
starting point the current plan proposed as part of the government’s Integrated Reform of Social Security 
and Tax Systems.  These plans call for increases in the consumption tax rate from 5% to 8% in April 2014 
and to 10% in October 2015.  With the oft-used rule of thumb that one percentage point hike of the 
consumption tax rate increases the tax revenue by 0.5% of GDP, the plan if implemented would increase 
the tax revenue from the current 30% of GDP to 31.5% of GDP in fiscal 2014 and 32% of GDP in fiscal 
2015.  
Under the assumption #1 for the interest rate, the tax policy is adjusted further to increase  tax 
revenue by 1% of GDP every year from 2016 to 2026 (so that the tax revenue becomes 43% of GDP).  If 
the level of tax revenue relative to GDP is then sustained from 2026 onwards, the debt to GDP ratio 
stabilizes.  In other words, the planned consumption tax increases so far are not sufficient, but continued 
efforts towards fiscal consolidation can eventually reduce the debt to a sustainable level.  If the market 
believes that the government will be eventually successful in implementing such measures, the low 
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interest rate observed for JGB is understandable.15
But this conclusion is sensitive to starting the fiscal adjustment promptly.  Hoshi and Ito (2012) 
repeat their calculations delaying the initial tax increase from 2014 to 2019, in this case the debt, while 
eventually sustainable, comes close to 90% of the private financial assets in the mid-2020s. 
   
The problem is more serious under the interest rate assumption #2 or #3.  Under assumption #2 
for example, the sustainable policy would raise the tax revenue to GDP ratio by 1.5% every year from 
2016 to 2027 so that the tax revenue to GDP ratio reaches 50%.  This level of taxes must be maintained 
for another 30 years or so before it can slowly decline.  But a 5-year delay in starting the fiscal 
consolidation would be fatal: the debt is then expected to surpass the private sector financial assets in 
2023. 
 The simulation exercises in Hoshi and Ito (2012) suggest that it is still possible for the Japanese 
government to stabilize the debt but the time is running out.  The consumption tax increases planned in 
the Integrated Reform of Social Security and Tax Systems are necessary but not sufficient.  What 
principles should govern the adjustments that must occur? 
First, it would be wise to achieve fiscal consolidation using both tax increases and spending cuts.  
Second, on the spending side the government should continue efforts to try to trim wasteful spending, but 
that is unlikely to be enough to make a meaningful reduction.  So it seems likely that some cuts in 
expenditure targeted at the elderly will be necessary.  As Figure 10 indicates the current elderly 
generation is slated to receive much more from the government (mostly in social security benefits) than 
they contributed because of a transfer to them from the young that are currently alive and yet to be born 
generations.   A reduction in promised social security benefits looks inevitable to us and given the 
circumstances would also be equitable.   
Third, the additional tax revenue should be raised using a phased-in series of consumption tax 
increases.  Raising tax revenue in this way has three important advantages.  First, taxing consumption is 
less distortionary than taxing income because it does not create incentives to reduce work.  In addition, a 
consumption tax affects both working and retired citizens.  Given the rapid aging problems it will be 
much more equitable to force all the citizens to share in paying for the accumulated debt.  Finally, by 
announcing a series of tax hikes, the government creates an incentive to consume sooner rather than later.  
By pulling some consumption forward this policy might help the economy in the short-run, but the higher 
level of taxes may slow the economy. 
Oguro and Kobayashi (2011, pp.90-91) reports an interesting finding that suggests fiscal 
consolidation may actually increase the economic growth if it results in the reduction of intergenerational 
inequity. By estimating a cross-country regression model, they find the countries that put more burdens 
on future generations tend to have low growth rates.  Although their regression analysis is silent about the 
causal direction, the result suggests that fiscal consolidation that reduces the intergenerational inequity 
may also increase the economic growth rate. 
The lack of a credible fiscal plan, on the other hand, would certainly jeopardize growth by 
                                                          
15 Even when the added debt to finance the reconstruction after the earthquake and tsunami of 2011 (2.4% of GDP in 
fiscal 2011 and 2.6% of GDP in fiscal 2012), the policy remains sustainable with a very small increase in the debt to 
GDP ratio during the transition.  The same is true under the other interest rate assumptions.  
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triggering a government debt crisis and increasing interest rates.  If the financial markets come to believe 
that the Japanese government does not in fact plan to stabilize the debt, the government will have 
difficulty financing the widening deficits. 
 
4.2.  Monetary expansion to end deflation 
 Ineffective monetary policy was another factor behind Japan’s stagnation that we pointed out in 
our previous report.  The Bank of Japan (BOJ) responded to the collapse of the bubble economy in the 
early 1990s by lowering its policy interest rate.  By late 1995, the policy interest rate was lowered to 0.5%, 
and in February 1999, the target call rate was pushed down to zero, starting the zero interest rate policy 
(ZIRP).  The BOJ, however, was reluctant to go further and try non-traditional monetary expansion such 
as quantitative easing.  This idea was floated by some economists including Kazuo Ueda, who was on the 
BOJ’s policy board from 1998 to 2003, but the BOJ resisted it.  Moreover, the BOJ often publicly 
expressed doubts about the ability of the ZIRP to stimulate the Japanese economy.  Masaru Hayami, the 
BOJ’s governor then even argued that the deflation may not be bad, undermining the credibility of the 
BOJ as a deflation fighter.   
In August 2000, the BOJ made a mistake of terminating the ZIRP even though the economy still 
suffered from deflation.  By March 2001, the BOJ had to go back to the ZIRP and finally started a 
quantitative easing (QE) policy.  Even then, the BOJ often downplayed the importance of the non-
traditional monetary policy, arguing changes in monetary policy were not needed for the recovery of the 
economy.  In 2006, the BOJ exited from the QE and then stopped the ZIRP.  During this period the BOJ 
also refused to set a clear target for the inflation rate or the price level.  Eventually it published its 
“understanding” of the inflation rates that are consistent with the price stability, which was identified as a 
range between 0% and 2%. 
 Continued deflation meant that the yen was pressured to appreciate against other major currencies.  
Figure 11 shows the trade weighted exchange rate for Japanese yen.  In nominal terms, the yen 
appreciated by about 100% from the early 1990s to 2012.  The real exchange rate fluctuated more than 
the nominal rate, with several period of sharp appreciation, most recently in late 2008 immediately 
following the Lehman Brothers failure, but the rate in early 2012 is roughly the same as that in the early 
1990s.  Thus, the most of phenomenal (nominal) appreciation of yen was the result of deflation. 
 The BOJ was again slow in expanding the monetary policy in non-traditional ways after the 
global financial crisis.  The BOJ often looked as if they were reluctantly following the actions of the 
Federal Reserve.  Figure 12 shows that BOJ did not expand the balance sheet as much as the Federal 
Reserve, the Bank of England, or the European Central Bank.  The BOJ also refused to have any “target” 
for the inflation rate. 
 After the global financial crisis, Japan fell back into recession and deflation.  In December 2008, 
the BOJ followed the Federal Reserve and cut the target call rate effectively to zero.  The BOJ, however, 
was very reluctant to dive back into quantitative easing and other non-traditional measures, even after the 
Federal Reserve implemented such policies.  Only in December 2009 did the BOJ take a step in this 
direction when it created a three-month loan facility of 10 trillion yen to lend against eligible collateral.  
The facility was later expanded (to 20 trillion yen) and supplemented by facilities that would lend for 
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periods beyond three months. 
In October, 2010, the BOJ introduced a comprehensive monetary easing policy, which clarified 
that the ZIRP would be continued until price stability (inflation rate of 0% to 2%) is in sight.  This 
included the establishment of an assets purchase program of up to 35 trillion yen.  Although the assets to 
be purchased included new categories such as ETF and J-REIT, the comprehensive monetary easing 
overall was not much different from the quantitative easing in the mid-2000s. Even after the 2011 
earthquake and tsunami, the BOJ’s policy stance did not change dramatically.  The assets purchase 
program was expanded by 5 trillion yen three days after the disaster, and the fund supplying operations to 
financial institutions in the affected areas started in late April.  The size of assets purchase program was 
further expanded to 50 trillion yen and then to 55 trillion yen in late 2011. 
 One reason why the BOJ was often reluctant to expand monetary policy through quantitative 
easing may be out of concern over the potential effects on zombies.   Absent an effective bank 
supervision regime, monetary accommodation can prolong the lives of zombie banks and zombie firms.  
Hoshi (2011) argues this is plausible and develops a simple model that explores the consequences of a 
lack of coordination between the monetary authority and the bank supervisory authority.  He finds that 
this can lead to the equilibrium where the monetary authority sets the inflation rate lower than either 
authority finds optimal.  Given the low level of supervisory effort, the central bank is reluctant to generate 
higher inflation because that would undermine economic restructuring.  Given the low inflation rate, the 
bank regulator is reluctant to exert supervisory effort because that would push the unemployment rate too 
high. 
 On February 14, 2012, the BOJ seemed to have made an important step towards becoming 
committed to ending deflation.  The bank jettisoned its “understanding” of the price stability and instead 
replaced it with a price stability “goal” which was specified to be the inflation rate of 1% per annum for 
the moment.  Many speculated that the BOJ’s move was a response to the government pressure to expand 
monetary policy and that it was only following the Federal Reserve action that specified an explicit 2% 
inflation rate target (and included a statement that the Federal Open Market Committee expects interest 
rates of near zero to continue into 2014).   
 The policy shift first appeared to have made a positive difference.   The yen/dollar exchange rate 
quickly depreciated to 80 yen per dollar or less.  The stock prices started to increase.  After three months, 
however, the yen appreciated back to below 80 yen, and the Nikkei 225 also came back down to the level 
before the policy change. 
To end the deflation, which has been continuing for more than 15 years, the BOJ should do more, 
including adjusting its communication policy.  For instance, the assets purchase program of the BOJ 
contains some innovative elements, such as purchases of ETFs and J-REITs.  The BOJ should stress these 
aspects of the policy, since standard monetary theory suggests that asset purchases are more effective 
when the central bank swaps bank reserves for assets that are not close substitutes for reserves.  Finally, if 
the BOJ’s reluctance is indeed due to the concerns on the lax bank supervision, as Hoshi (2011) suggests, 
increasing the role of the BOJ in financial supervision would make it easier for the BOJ to conduct more 






The Japanese economy has stagnated for the most of the last 20 years.  As we argued in our 2011 NIRA 
report, Japan does not have to continue the stagnation.  This report has provided some concrete policies 
that Japan can implement to restore the growth.  We do not claim the list is exhaustive but this is a good 
starting point. 
 Our proposal covers three policy areas: regulatory reforms, opening up to the rest of the world, 
and improving macroeconomic policies.   The regulatory reforms include several efforts to reduce the cost 
of doing business, stopping the measures to help zombie firms, and renewing the commitment to 
deregulate, especially in non-manufacturing.  Special zones for structural reform that were tried under the 
Koizumi government also could be used to push deregulation, but many measures specified in the new 
special zones approved for the areas affected by the earthquake and tsunami disaster do not appear 
promising.  Among the options for opening up Japan to the rest of the world, the success of the currently 
debated TPP will be important.  Trade liberalization not only increases the Japanese consumer’s welfare 
through the traditional trade channel but can also contribute through higher productivity growth of the 
Japanese firms that compete in the global markets.  To allow the Japanese agriculture to adjust to the 
globalized world, the agricultural policy needs to be changed.  Opening up to allow more immigration, 
especially by foreigners who would contribute to innovation, would also help.  Finally, getting the 
macroeconomic policies right is another thing Japan can do to restore growth.  A credible policy to future 
fiscal consolidation is necessary to remove policy uncertainty and make fiscal policy sustainable.  More 
aggressive and clear monetary policy to put an end to deflation that has persisted since the Bank of Japan 
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SAR, China 2 5 1 57 3 2 
United States 4 13 17 16 72 20 
Korea, Rep. 8 24 26 71 38 4 
Australia 15 2 42 38 53 30 
Japan 20 107 63 58 120 16 
Taiwan, China 25 16 87 33 71 23 
Chile 39 27 90 53 45 62 
Italy 87 77 96 84 134 63 
China 91 151 179 40 122 60 
Greece 100 135 41 150 83 84 
 
* For Dealing with Construction Permits, one data point on cost was corrected. Rankings are 
adjusted once a year with each published report. 
Additional note: All Doing Business 2011 rankings have been recalculated to reflect changes to 
the methodology. For further details on changes, please refer to the data notes   
25 
 
Table 2. Government Committees for Deregulation: Feb. 1998 to Present 
 
Name Met during Prime Ministers 
Regulatory Reforms Commission (規
制改革委員会) 
February 1998 – March 2001 Hashimoto, Obuchi, 
Mori 
Council on Comprehensive 
Regulatory Reforms (総合規制改革
会議) 
April 2001 – March 2004 Koizumi 
Council on Regulatory Reforms and 
Promotion of Opening up to Private 
Sector (規制改革・民間開放推進会
議) 
April 2004 – January 2007 Koizumi, Abe 
Council on Regulatory Reforms (規
制改革会議) 
January 2007 – February 2010 Abe, Fukuda, Aso, 
Hatoyama 
Sub-committee concerning 
Regulatory and Institutional Reforms 
(規制・制度改革に関する分科会) 
(within Council on Administrative 
Renewal (行政刷新会議)) 
March 2010 – Present Hatoyama, Kan, 
Noda 
 







Table 3. Special Zones Approved for the Affected Areas (as of May 1, 2012) 
 
Special zone Deregulation or promotion measures 
Aomori I • Low interest loans to affected firms and firms that hire the workers 
who lost jobs because of the disaster 
• Investment subsidies and employment subsidies to the firms in the 
affected areas 
• R&D subsidies for energy saving manufacturing technology 
• Subsidies to firms that use transportation services at Hachinohe Port 
Fukushima I • Relaxes entry restriction for medical equipment producers and 
distributers (drops the required three year experience) 
Fukushima II • Subsidies to companies that newly enters or expands in Fukushima 
• Interest payment credit for cities/towns that create industrial zones 
• Help local firms in semi-conductor industry and transportation 
durables industry develop business contacts in Tokyo areas 
• Subsidies to reproducible energy industry: Encouraging more 
collaboration between universities and industries 
• Subsidies to R&D investment in advanced medical equipment 
• Export promotion for medical and elderly care devices 
• Subsidized loans for affected companies 
• Financial support for the fund created to lend to distressed firms in 
the area 
• Financial support for the fund created to buy up existing loans to 
small and medium enterprises in the area 
Fukushima III • Relaxation of requirements to be qualified medical or elderly care 
facilities 
Fukushima IV • Subsidy to Development Bank of Japan for its loans (exceeding 300 
million yen) to Mitsubishi Shindo in Aizu Wakamatsu City 
Ibaragi • Tax exemptions for the companies that newly enter or expand in 
Ibaragi prefecture 
• Reduction of water fees for the companies that newly build factories 
in certain areas 
• Reduction of electricity fees for the companies located around 
nuclear power facilities in Ibaragi 
• Loans to the companies in Ibaragi for new investment 
• Loans and interest credits to small and medium enterprises affected 
by the disaster 
• Marketing campaign for agricultural and fishery products of Ibaragi 
• Encourage small and medium enterprises to enter promising growth 
industries 
Iwate I • Relaxation of minimum standards for opening up medical offices, 
pharmacies, home-visit rehabilitation services 




• Subsidies to the firms that provide training related to automobile and 
automobile parts manufacturing 
• Subsidies to the firms in medical equipment industry 
• Loan program to the firms that newly build factories or expand the 
existing facilities 
• Promotion of buying Iwate products in Iwate 
• Establish organizations to promote semi-conductor industry 
Miyagi I • Investment subsidies, tax relief, and loan programs for specified 
industries (manufacturing, research, transportation, warehousing, 
packaging, and wholesale) 
• Providing consulting and subsidies to affected firms 
• Encouraging investment by foreign firms 
Miyagi II • Investment subsidies to specified industries (manufacturing, 
research, transportation, warehousing, packaging, and wholesale) 
• Financial assistance for farmers to process and/or market their 
products 
• Advising on how to incorporate farms 
• Helping famers develop business contacts with manufacturers and 
distributors 
• Export promotion of agricultural products 
• Promotion of agricultural tourism 
• Promotion of information technology for farmers 
Miyagi III • Tax exemptions for seafood processing related industries 
• Loans and interest credits to small and medium enterprises 
• Subsidies to the companies that newly establish or expand their 
facilities 
• Promotion of tourism 
Miyagi IV • Investment subsidies to specified industries (manufacturing, 
research, transportation, warehousing, packaging, and wholesale) 
• Tax reliefs for the companies that newly establish or expand 
facilities in Ishinomaki City 
• Loans and subsidies to affected firms 
• Inviting new firms to Ishinomaki 
• Public works including public housing, medical facilities, a museum 
(renovation), waterfront development, and tourist attractions 
• Projects to build a compact and environmentally friendly city 
Miyagi V • Encourage larger scale farming 
• Building a large crop drying and storage facility 
• Relaxation of conversion restrictions on farmland 
Miyagi VI • Temporary (3 years) relaxation of the minimum requirements 
(number of doctors, facility areas, experience, etc.) for medical 




• Promotion of agglomeration of health care industry 
• Subsidies to rebuild affected medical facilities 
 




Table 4. Net Migration Rates for G7 Countries 
Country 
Proportion of Migrant 
Stock (% of total 
population) 
Average Annual Net 







Canada 21.3 6.3 Yes 
France 10.7 1.6 Yes 
Germany 13.1 1.3 Yes 
Italy 7.4 5.6 Yes 
Japan 1.7 0.2 No 
United Kingdom 10.4 3.1 Yes 
United States of America 13.5 3.3 Yes 
 




Figure 1a. Amount of Restructured Loans for Large Banks (Unit: 100 million yen) 
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Figure 3a. Total Factor Productivity of Manufacturing  
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Figure 7. Total Factor Productivity of Agriculture 
























































Figure 10 Lifetime Net Transfers (in present value term) from the Government by Age 
Group as of 2003 
Units: million yen 
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Effective Exchange Rate (2010=100)  
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate Real Effective Exchange Rate 
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